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 1 The living and its milieu 
 The most explicit and detailed account of Uexküll’s concepts in Canguilhem’s 
work can be found in “The Living and its Milieu,” one of the philosophical chap-
ters of his book  Knowledge of Life , published in  1952 . This book collects vari-
ous conferences delivered by Canguilhem, with only one previously unpublished 
text added as Introduction under the title “Thought and the living.” The chapter 
“The Living and its Milieu” was originally a conference presented at the Collège 
Philosophique in Paris in 1946–47 ( Canguilhem 2001 ). This was only three years 
after the publication of his first book,  The Normal and the Pathological ( 1943 ), in 
which he studied and interpreted Kurt Goldstein’s main work,  The Organism: A 
Holistic Approach to Biology Derived from Pathological Data in Man ( 1934 ). In 
this text, Goldstein quotes Uexküll many times. It is then probable that Canguil-
hem was first acquainted with Uexküll’s theories through Goldstein. In fact, in 
“The Living and its Milieu,” Canguilhem deals with both their theories together. 
According to Canguilhem, Uexküll and Goldstein reverse the problem of the 
organism–milieu relationship, as they claim that characteristic of the living is to 
make a milieu for itself whereas the study of a living being under experimental 
conditions is to impose a milieu on it. 
 Canguilhem explains and distinguishes first Uexküll’s concepts of  Umwelt , 
 Umgebung , and  Welt . For Canguilhem, the  Umwelt designates “the milieu of 
behavior proper to a certain organism”; the  Umgebung , “the banal geographical 
environment”; and the  Welt , “the universe of science” ( Canguilhem 2008 , 111). 
The  Umwelt is “an ensemble of excitations, which have the value and signification 
of signals” ( Canguilhem 2008 , 111). The living does not react to all the physical 
excitations of the environment but only to those of which it is notified and which 
presuppose a previous interest. In this manner, the excitation comes ultimately 
from the subject and is anticipated by their attitude. In this regard, Canguilhem 
states that “a living being is not a machine, which responds to excitations with 
movements, it is a machinist, who responds to signals with operations” ( Canguil-
hem 2008 , 111). Consequently, among the almost unlimited number of excitations 
from the environment, the organism only detects some signals [ Merkmale ]. One 
could then say that the  Umwelt is an “elective extraction from the  Umgebung , the 
geographical environment” ( Canguilhem 2008 , 112). As the core of this  Umwelt , 
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then, one finds a subjectivity that organizes the milieu, centered according to the 
vital values that constitute the subject itself. To exemplify this, Canguilhem cites 
Uexküll’s account on the  Umwelt of the tick ( Uexk üll 2010, 44;  Ostachuk 2013 ). 
 Of all the stimuli that could exist in the environment of the tick, only three of 
them have relevance for it and make up its world. After mating, the adult female 
climbs, guided by the photo-receptiveness of her skin, to the branch of a tree and 
waits. This is the first stimulus. She can wait, immobile and inactive, without feed-
ing or taking refuge, up to eighteen years: only the right stimulus can take her out 
of that state of quiescence and start her up again in her life cycle. When a mammal 
passes under the tree chosen by the tick as a hunting post, she lets herself drop, 
guided by the smell of butyric acid secreted by the perspiration of the animal. This is 
the second stimulus. When she has fallen on the animal, she fixes onto it in response 
to the temperature of its blood. This is the third stimulus. Once fixed to the animal, 
she goes to the source of the heat, arriving at areas of the animal free of hair, and 
finally sucks its blood. Only when her stomach is full of blood does a biological 
response begin, which consists of releasing the spermatozoa that were encapsulated 
in the female and fertilizing the eggs that await in the ovary. Consequently, the tick 
can fulfill her life cycle in a few hours, after which she dies, having been able to wait 
up to eighteen years. During that long period of waiting and inactivity, nothing that 
may surround the tick has any meaning for her. Only the three stimuli mentioned 
earlier have meaning for her and constitute her  Umwelt (see  Uexk üll 2010, xx). 
 Canguilhem then goes on to compare this theory with Goldstein’s. Goldstein 
starts from the criticism of the mechanical theory of reflexes. The reflex is not an 
isolated reaction but is always a function of sense and orientation, which depends 
on the signification of a situation as an ensemble. In this respect, an animal in an 
experimental situation is in “an abnormal situation, a situation it does not need 
according to its own norms; it has not chosen this situation, which is imposed on 
it” ( Canguilhem 2008 , 113). An organism is never equal to the theoretical total-
ity of its possibilities, but it has its own privileged behaviors that respond to its 
own vital norms. For Goldstein, the relationship between the organism and the 
environment is established as a debate [ Auseinandersetzung , coming to terms] 
“to which the living brings its own proper norms of appreciating situations, both 
dominating the milieu and accommodating itself to it” ( Canguilhem 2008 , 113). 
The relationship does not consist then in a struggle or opposition, the latter con-
cerning rather a pathological state: “The situation of a living being commanded 
from the outside by the milieu is what Goldstein considers the archetype of a 
catastrophic situation” ( Canguilhem 2008 , 113). To live is to organize the envi-
ronment from a center of reference, and a healthy life is a life relying on its exis-
tence and its values. For Canguilhem, the organism is a being with sense and its 
individuality is a character in the order of values. 
 2 Uexküll:  Umwelt and conformity to a plan 
 Uexküll proposes “a walk into unknown worlds” ( Uexk üll 2010, 41), worlds 
strange to us but known to other creatures, “as diverse as the animals themselves” 









( Uexk üll 2010, 42). In order to do this, he suggests, we must create an imaginary 
soap bubble around each creature. Each of these bubbles contains only the percep-
tions to which the creature has access and then forms its own true world. Each of 
these bubbles represents the world as it appears to the organisms themselves. As 
each organism perceives differently, there are as many of these worlds as there are 
organisms in nature. Uexküll does not consider organisms as mere objects but as 
subjects whose essential activity consists in perceiving and acting. Everything an 
organism perceives is part of its perceptual world [ Merkwelt ], while everything 
an organism makes is part of its operational world [ Wirkwelt ]. The perceptual and 
operational world together form a closed unit called  Umwelt ( Uexk üll 2010, 42; 
 Ostachuk 2013 ). In this manner, even if the same objects are present in a certain 
environment, they will not be perceived in the same way by the different organ-
isms, and they will not have the same meaning for them. 
 The second important Uexküllian concept to consider in this context – that is to 
say, when it comes to the relation between an organism and its environment – is 
that of conformity to a plan [ Planm äß igkeit ]. Uexküll calls conformity to a plan 
the force of nature “that combines the manifold details into one whole by means 
of rules. Higher rules, which unite things separated even by time, are in general 
called plans” ( Uexk üll 1926, 175). Elsewhere, Uexküll defines conformity to a 
plan as “a rule stretching across time and space,” “a rule in living Nature, which 
reveals itself even in the mechanical processes of the organism” ( Uexk üll 1926, 
270), and as “a super-mechanical law” ( Uexk üll 1926, 271). Conformity to a plan 
is responsible for the creation of all organisms and their  Umwelten , it is like the 
score laying out the “melody,” which accounts for the whole of nature. Ultimately, 
conformity to a plan ensures the perfect complementarity between the different 
organisms and their  Umwelten . 
 By means of this notion, Uexküll expresses himself against the concept of 
adaptation. From the point of view of the adaptation theory, in fact, “each organ-
ism is the product of influences to which it has been exposed for thousands of 
years” ( Uexk üll 1926, 319). Through innumerable cycles of trial and error, organ-
isms reach their appropriate form, a final product adapted and congruent to the 
conditions of the environment in which they are present. Uexküll also criticizes 
the Darwinian theory, which aims to explain adaptation through the mechanism 
of natural selection. According to Darwinism, the struggle for existence deter-
mines organisms to compete with each other, a struggle in which only the “most 
adapted” will be able to survive. Differently, according to Uexküll, it is impos-
sible for an organism, even a machine, in which all parts fit together properly, to 
arise through such a mechanism: “It certainly requires a powerful imagination 
to assume that any machine capable of functioning could arise in this way. But 
the Darwinians provide the requisite imagination” ( Uexk üll 1926, 320). In other 
words, Uexküll argues, it is impossible for a cooperative structure to emerge from 
a competitive mechanism. 
 According to Uexküll, then, nature produces all its organisms following a plan. 
The adjustment between the different parts of an organism, and between the organ-
ism and its  Umwelt , is not produced by external erosion or molding, but they are 
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adjusted, they are  congruent with each other, from the beginning. This congruity 
is guaranteed by the plan, which is what builds the organisms in harmony with 
their  Umwelten . The plan for the construction of the  Umwelt of each organism 
at any given moment, as well as the tunnel formed by the addition of its succes-
sive vital moments, what Uexküll calls  life-tunnel , is fixed and is not subject to 
change. However, Uexküll also recognizes that deviations may occur which are 
responsible for generating the illusion of the variability of organisms. These devi-
ations are of secondary importance, and Darwin’s error was to have made them 
the main feature, when the main characteristic is the plan itself. Needless to say, 
the notion of conformity to a plan is not without difficulties. One could raise for 
instance the objection that the reduction of the whole of nature to a supermechani-
cal rule, that includes all the functional circles established between organisms and 
their  Umwelten , entails also the reduction of the concept of subject to the mere 
assembly of functional circles, unlikely to allow much room for the characteristic 
autonomy and creativity of organisms. This point will be, as we shall see, the 
target of Kurt Goldstein’s criticisms of Uexküll’s theory. 
 In short, to ensure harmony and the perfect adjustment between organisms and 
their environments, Uexküll advocates the existence of a predetermined world, 
a world in which life-tunnels are fixed and predestined: “Proceeding from these 
immutable factors that determine all life in the world, we come to see that life itself 
is based on fixed laws, which are in conformity to a plan” ( Uexk üll 1926, 84). 
 3  Goldstein: the debate between the organism and its 
environment 
 In the section “Criticism of the Purely Environmental Theory” of his work  The 
Organism , Goldstein criticizes, in the last instance, the theory of Uexküll. Gold-
stein argues that an organism not only lives in its own environment, to which 
it is perfectly adjusted, but must also deal with all other stimuli of the environ-
ment, including potentially negative ones. The organism does not live isolated 
or segregated in its own environment as if the rest of the world did not exist and 
all the stimuli it receives were adequate for it. For Goldstein, the environment 
of an organism is neither definitive nor static, but it is formed with the develop-
ment and activities of the organism. In this manner, he affirms: “One could say 
that the environment emerges from the world through the being or actualization 
of the organism” ( Goldstein 1995 , 85). In other words, the organism, in order to 
exist, must find an adequate environment for itself; it must create it taking advan-
tage of the opportunities offered by the world. “An environment always presup-
poses a given organism” ( Goldstein 1995 , 85) and not the other way around. An 
organism does not acquire order at the expense of its environment; an organism 
rather acquires order at the same time that the environment obtains it. However, 
Goldstein subsequently seems to change his mind, as he states that the “environ-
ment first arises from the world only when there is an ordered organism” ( Gold-
stein 1995 , 85), thus suggesting that first there must be an ordered organism for 
an environment to be created. According to this second version, order comes 









ultimately from the organism itself. In this regard, Goldstein brings the case of a 
diseased organism. For this organism, the environment prior to its state of disease 
has become strange and disturbing so that the essential requirement to exist and 
to return to a state of new normality is to make for itself once more an adequate 
environment. If we consider in-depth the previous case, we see in reality that the 
order is restored with the creation of a new adequate environment and not by 
reverting to a previous or anterior order of the organism on its own. Consequently, 
the restoration of order obviously requires the activity of the organism, but it is 
achieved and reached when it finds the appropriate conditions for the generation 
of a new adequate environment. 
 For Goldstein, the fundamental relationship between an organism and its envi-
ronment is a debate or coming to terms ( Goldstein 1995 , 42;  Ostachuk 2015 ). 
There is a fundamental separation between the organism and its environment, which 
makes them strange and which requires a constant debate and coming to terms 
between the two so that the relationship can be maintained. The organism achieves 
this coming to terms through a behavioral act called performance [ Leistung ]. When 
a performance is effective, the organism develops an ordered behavior. This is char-
acteristic of a normal or healthy state. On the contrary, when a performance is inef-
fective, the organism develops a disordered behavior, which manifests itself in the 
form of a “catastrophic” reaction. This is the characteristic state of a pathological 
or disease state. In this case, the organism will proceed to recover the normal situ-
ation. This amounts to saying that there is a tendency in the organism to live in 
ordered behavior. Therefore, for Goldstein, disease consists of a disarrangement or 
disequilibrium that breaks the productive relationship between the organism and its 
environment. On the other hand, “an organism that actualizes its essential pecu-
liarities, or – what really means the same thing – meets its adequate milieu [ Umwelt ] 
and the tasks arising from it, is ‘normal’” ( Goldstein 1995 , 325). Goldstein arrives, 
in this manner, at a definition of normality. Normality, or the normal state, is the state 
in which the organism develops norms that allow it to respond adequately to its envi-
ronment. Moreover, recovering health, that is, rehabilitation, consists of reaching a 
new order, a new normality, a new individual norm, which implies making for itself 
a new environment in which it can respond appropriately again. 
 The organism, in its relation to the environment, not only seeks its preservation 
[ Erhaltung ] but also its prosperity. For Goldstein, survival is the typical lifestyle 
of the disease state. A healthy organism not only seeks self-preservation but also 
aspires to self-realization [ Selbstverwirklichung ]. Self-realization is the tendency 
of organisms to realize their own essence and their peculiar individuality. This can 
be interpreted as a critique of Darwin’s theory, which postulates natural selection 
as an evolutionary mechanism, based on the “struggle for existence,” the competi-
tion among individuals, and the “survival of the fittest.” For Goldstein, this would 
be a model of the world and society in pathological and disease state. 
 4 Canguilhem: normativity and institution of norms and values 
 The element of novelty introduced by Canguilhem in the relationship between the 
organism and its environment is that the former is characterized by the faculty of 
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creating and instituting norms; that is to say, it possesses normativity or normative 
activity ( Ostachuk 2015 ). In this respect, the organism not only has norms and is 
able to fulfill them, that is, it possesses normality, but its most characteristic and 
genuine feature also is that of creating and instituting new norms, that is, it pos-
sesses normativity. This is already stated by Canguilhem in his first book,  The 
Normal and the Pathological : 
 life is polarity and thereby even an unconscious position of value; in short, 
life is in fact a normative activity[. . . .] Normative, in the fullest sense of the 
word, is that which establishes norms. And it is in this sense that we plan to 
talk about biological normativity. 
 ( Canguilhem 1991 , 126f.) 
 A healthy organism then does not limit itself to self-preservation, resisting any vari-
ation and adaptation to new situations, but embodies norms that drive it forward: 
 Health is more than normality; in simple terms, it is normativity. Behind all 
apparent normality, one must look to see if it is capable of tolerating infrac-
tions of the norm, of overcoming contradictions, of dealing with conflicts. 
Any normality open to possible future correction is authentic normativity, or 
health. Any normality limited to maintaining itself, hostile to any variation 
in the themes that express it, and incapable of adapting to new situations is a 
normality devoid of normative intention. 
 ( Canguilhem 1994 , 351) 
 A healthy organism does not seek so much to preserve itself, to maintain its state 
and its environment, but, rather, to realize its own nature, which implies seeking 
new challenges, overcoming new obstacles and, ultimately, exposing itself to new 
risks. Consequently, a healthy organism is constantly exposed to the risk of losing 
its order and entering into situations of catastrophic reaction, that is, of becom-
ing ill. A measure of the health of an organism is its capacity to overcome these 
crises and establish a new order, restoring an adequate relationship with its new 
environment. On the other hand, the pathological state does not imply the total 
absence of norms. Disease is itself a norm of life. However, it is a norm that does 
not tolerate deviations in the conditions of the relationship with its environment 
and is incapable of transforming itself into another norm. In other words, “the sick 
living being is normalized in well-defined conditions of existence and has lost 
his normative capacity, the capacity to establish other norms in other conditions” 
( Canguilhem 1991 , 183). 
 5 Teleology and polarity in the organism 
 Canguilhem makes it clear that organisms have a polarity that consists in actual-
izing their own norms and values; that is to say, organisms are normative. This 
echoes Goldstein’s suggestion that the natural tendency of organisms is to actual-
ize their own essence, that is, the tendency toward self-realization. 









 Despite these claims, Goldstein explicitly opposes the teleological approach to 
organisms. His explanation is however not free of ambiguities and inconsisten-
cies. In the first place, Goldstein rejects the teleological approach but recognizes 
that an “inner purposiveness in the sense of Kant” ( Goldstein 1995 , 323) could be 
accepted. He then introduces Karl Ernst von Baer’s distinction between purpose 
[ Zweck ] and goal [ Ziel ]: “According to him ‘purpose’ is an intended task, whereas 
‘end’ is a given direction of activity, an intrinsically predetermined effect” ( Gold-
stein 1995 , 324). Following von Baer, Goldstein maintains that the concept of 
purpose is inadequate and should be abandoned, while the concept of goal, which 
he interprets as the actualization of an essence, is useful and adequate for the 
understanding of the organism. With this explanation, Goldstein seems to support 
rather than reject teleology in organisms. The definitions of  goal as “an intrinsi-
cally predetermined effect” and “actualization of an essence” are even compatible 
with the Aristotelian conception of teleology ( Ostachuk 2016 ). 
 Uexküll had already pointed to the importance of von Baer’s distinction between 
purpose and goal, although he explains it in more detail, quoting an example from 
von Baer himself: 
 When a bullet leaves the barrel of a gun and hits the target, the target is the 
factor that prescribes the path for the ball. If we imagine the act of shooting 
to be eliminated, we must ascribe to the ball itself the property of being influ-
enced directly by the target in the direction its movement takes. In such a case 
the ball possesses what Baer calls “effort toward a goal.” 
 ( Uexk üll 1926, 316) 
 According to von Baer, an embryo possesses this “effort toward a goal.” Uexküll 
does not agree with this argument. In the first place, Uexküll considers that the 
goal is not the adult organism but the congruity with its  Umwelt . In the second 
place, he believes that this goal cannot be achieved through this “effort toward a 
goal.” For Uexküll, there are no influences from the  Umwelt that can affect or alter 
the course of development of an embryo, since it does not possess the necessary 
organs to know the properties of the external world. And yet, says Uexküll, we see 
that the embryo “unerringly produces definite counter-properties, which fit into a 
definite group of properties in the external world” ( Uexk üll 1926, 317). This hap-
pens thanks to the perfect congruity between the organism and its  Umwelt ensured 
by the conformity to a plan. 
 In fact, von Baer’s example itself seems inappropriate. Eliminating the act of 
shooting in order to ascribe to the bullet the property of being attracted by the 
target makes for an unjustified assumption that leads to a wrong conclusion. In 
this particular case, the one responsible for determining the direction of the bul-
let is the shooter, not the target. Without a shooter, the bullet would not be fired, 
and if it were fired accidentally, its direction would be completely random. In 
general terms, without an agent there is no action, the action being a movement 
with a specific purpose. And it is the agent who contributes to the end of a certain 
action. Furthermore, von Baer’s distinction between purpose and goal seems to 
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be compatible with Driesch’s distinction between dynamic and static teleology 
( Ostachuk 2016 ). Every machine has an end. However, this end is given exter-
nally by the designer or constructor of the machine. This is the external, static 
teleology, in which what is sought is the fulfillment of a goal or an end [ Ziel ]. An 
organism, on the other hand, is not only capable of fulfilling a given end but also 
of creating and choosing new ends, that is to say, it possesses a purposive capac-
ity that allows it to adopt autonomic actions. An organism possesses internal, 
dynamic teleology, in which what is sought is the fulfillment or achievement of a 
purpose [ Zweck ]. In other words, it possesses purposiveness. 
 6 The organism and the machine 
 There is only one case in which von Baer’s concept of “effort toward a goal” 
would be compatible with Uexküll’s theory. It is the case in which the goal is the 
plan itself. If we accept this, we must accept at the same time that the world and 
nature are machines and that they work only according to mechanical laws. This is 
what Uexküll seems to indicate when he talks about the plan as “a supermechani-
cal law.” However, this mechanical view does not seem compatible with his view 
of a world populated by subjects. Despite believing that there is a distinct differ-
ence and a discontinuity between living beings and physico-chemical processes, 
Uexküll states that this difference is that the latter are mere mechanical pro-
cesses, while the former have “supermechanical powers.” These supermechanical 
powers of organisms consist of: the construction of the machine, the running of 
the machine, and the repair of the machine ( Uexk üll 1926, 121). These powers 
come, ultimately, from the rules of conformity to a plan. 
 Canguilhem hardly agrees with these reasonings of Uexküll. He, rather, strongly 
supports the irreducibility of the organism to the machine: “it is an illusion to 
think that purpose can be expelled from the organism by comparing it to a com-
posite of automatisms, no matter how complex” ( Canguilhem 2008 , 91). Inspired 
by Bichat, he remarks that there is no mechanical pathology; that is, a machine 
does not get ill. There is no distinction between health and disease in a machine. 
A machine cannot be healthy or diseased because it does not establish a relation-
ship with an environment, and as we have already seen, for Goldstein and Can-
guilhem, health consists of an adequate and productive relationship with one’s 
own environment. Based on Hans Driesch’s experiments, Canguilhem states that 
embryological development cannot be reduced to a mechanical model. Whereas 
Uexküll argues in favor of the perfect congruity between all organisms and their 
 Umwelten , Canguilhem advocates the autonomy of the living. One could even 
wonder if the relationship itself between the organism and the environment is not 
annulled by the very idea of a perfect but fixed and invariant adjustment. Once 
the relational element is eliminated, the “possibility” of change and variation over 
time is also erased. However, the autonomy of the living seems to require this 
possibility of “relation” with its own environment. And unless one wishes to pro-
mote the existence of a world populated only by machines, ordered and adjusted 
to each other mechanically, one should not do without the idea of autonomy. In 










short, as soon as teleology disappears from nature, the organism falls back into 
the status of a machine. 
 For Canguilhem, the organism presents the properties of self-construction, 
self-conservation, self-regulation, and self-repair, while for a machine, “its con-
struction is foreign” and “conservation demands the constant surveillance and 
vigilance of the machinist” ( Canguilhem 2008 , 88). And the plan is not a machin-
ist, but the blueprint that the machinist uses to build and repair the machine. 
 7  The archaic relationship between the organism 
and its environment 
 In later years, in his work  The Theory of Meaning [ Bedeutungslehre ], Uexküll 
develops his theory more explicitly and extensively in musical terms. The devel-
opment of organisms and their  Umwelten is part of a great symphony in which 
all organisms play melodies that are assembled with each other by point and 
counterpoint: “Every animal, like every instrument, harbors a certain number of 
tones that enter into contrapuntal relationships with the tones of other animals” 
( Uexk üll 1982, 63). He no longer explains the congruity and perfect adjustment 
between organisms and their  Umwelten as a fitting between “pegs and sockets” 
( Uexk üll 1926, 317) but, rather, in terms of the existence of an interrelation and 
interpenetration between them. In this regard, Uexküll tells us that just as the 
flower is beelike, the bee is flowerlike so that the melodies played by both reso-
nate in unison. 
 A much more elaborate example, within this perspective, is that of the spider’s 
web. The spider builds its web according to the structural characteristics of the fly 
so that the latter cannot see it and gets caught when flying toward it. However, the 
spider does this without even having come into contact with a fly. So, how does 
this correspondence occur? Uexküll’s explanation is the following: 
 It weaves its web before it is ever confronted with an actual fly. The web, 
therefore, cannot represent the physical image of a fly, but rather it is a repre-
sentation of the archetype of a fly, which does not exist in the physical world. 
 ( Uexk üll 1982, 42) 
 This first explanation then holds that each organism develops thanks to the exis-
tence of an original program or archetype and that, in some way, the archetype 
of the fly influences the archetype of the spider ( Uexk üll 1982, 43). Few pages 
later, Uexküll provides a more detailed and accurate explanation of this biological 
phenomenon: 
 The spider’s web is certainly formed in a ‘fly-like’ manner, because the spi-
der itself is ‘fly-like.’ To be ‘fly-like’ means that the body structure of the 
spider has taken on certain of the fly’s characteristics – not from a specific 
fly, but rather from the fly’s archetype. To express it more accurately, the 








 The organism and its  Umwelt 167
spider’s ‘fly-likeness’ comes about when its body structure has adopted cer-
tain themes from the fly’s melody. 
 ( Uexk üll 1982, 66) 
 One way of interpreting this is to think that what we see as individualized and 
interacting elements in the real physical world exist archaically all included in 
a great invisible world, in which an overlap of resonant melodies occurs, and in 
which a clear and sharp separation between them cannot be established. Accord-
ingly, a “relation” is the expression of an original resonant overlap. The evident 
complementarity and reciprocity between organisms and their  Umwelten are the 
expression of a great symphony made up by a multitude of melodies resonating 
in unison. 
 There is no such melodic language, or the proposal of a universal intercon-
nectivity in nature, in the works of Goldstein and Canguilhem. For them, the 
autonomy of the organism and the living prevails. However, it could be ventured 
that norms and values play this melodic role in the relations between organisms 
and their environments and that with each norm and value that is actualized, the 
resonance in unison Uexküll talks about is produced. 
 8 Meaning and sense 
 In his work,  The Theory of Meaning , Uexküll also argues that meaning is the 
fundamental and key property for the understanding of life. All the objects of the 
 Umwelt of an organism are subject-related meaning carriers. Meaning is the con-
nector that unites the organism with each object of its  Umwelt : “In every instance 
a very intimate meaning rule joins the animal and its medium” ( Uexk üll 1982, 
54). In even more explicit terms, he also says that “[m]eaning in nature’s score 
serves as a connecting link, or rather as a bridge” ( Uexk üll 1982, 64). On the other 
hand, the same object can have different meanings for different organisms. For 
example, a flower stem acts as a different meaning-carrier for different meaning 
utilizers: while for an ant, it is a path, for a cicada larva, it is a supplier of material 
for the building of a house, and for a cow, it is food. 
 This worldview transforms nature into a huge network of interconnections 
established through meaning. This ecological view of nature, which can act as 
an antidote to the mercantilist and competitive views of today, leaves out, how-
ever, the consideration of sense. Uexküll provides a very interesting example with 
regard to this question. The pea-beetle larva, thanks to its tunnel-boring activity, 
builds a tunnel that allows the adult beetle to leave the pea. If it were not for this 
tunnel exit, the adult larva would die. This example allows Uexküll to cast doubt 
on von Baer’s claims regarding the presence of a goal-directedness in the origin of 
living creatures. Unlike the example of the spider web, in which other organisms 
intervene, which allows Uexküll to assign the anticipation of the spider to the par-
ticipation in the fly’s melody, in this example, this does not happen. It is the same 
organism that anticipates a future event of its own development: the larva knows 










in some way that it has to build a tunnel so that the adult organism can then leave 
the pea. There is an intentionality on the part of the organism that is not contained 
in the concept of meaning. Meaning can only act as an extrinsic connector of phe-
nomena. But here we are in the presence of a prediction of a future event, which 
speaks of the existence of a subjective interiority. This interiority of the living is 
what anticipates, it has intentions, in short, it actualizes its potentialities. 
 Canguilhem adopts this second version of the matter. For him, the consider-
ation of sense in biology can never be omitted: 
 A center does not resolve into its environment. A living being is not reduc-
ible to a crossroads of influences. From this stems the insufficiency of any 
biology that, in complete submission to the spirit of the physico-chemical 
sciences, would seek to eliminate all consideration of sense from its domain. 
From the biological and psychological point of view, a sense is an apprecia-
tion of values in relation to a need. 
 ( Canguilhem 2008 , 120) 
 A living being is then an irreducible center of reference, which has needs and 
institutes norms and values to satisfy them. Consequently, whereas Uexküll 
emphasizes nature as a network of interconnections mediated by meaning, Can-
guilhem insists on the centrality and irreducibility of an organism that establishes 
relations of sense with its environment. 
 9 Life 
 Our three authors make for an interesting panel for a discussion of the concept of 
life. Even between Goldstein and Canguilhem, who otherwise tend toward con-
cordance rather than dissonance, this topic brings out the greatest differences and 
nuances. 
 Perhaps the most difficult position to decipher on this subject, Uexküll’s posi-
tion, on one hand, establishes a clear difference between biology and physics 
and chemistry and argues strenuously for the irreducibility of the living to mere 
physico-chemical processes. On the other hand, with his concept of conformity 
to a plan, he seems to make organisms and their  Umwelten , and ultimately life-
tunnels, depend on supermechanical rules and laws, supporting unchangeable 
congruity and perfect adjustment between each other. This leaves, as we have 
already seen, the autonomy of the organism in a rather inconvenient situation. 
 According to Uexküll’s distinction between a machine and a living being, a 
machine is constructed based on a building plan [ Bauplan ] in which the spa-
tial arrangement and function of its different parts are made explicit. And that 
is enough, since “machines originate namely by assembling ready-made parts 
into a whole” ( Uexk üll 1913, 155; my transl.). Living beings, instead, do not 
originate by the assembly of ready-made parts. Uexküll explains that the prob-
lem of the origin of living beings has divided researchers into two groups. On 
one corner, there are those who at the origin of machines recognize two factors, 
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human representation, that is, building plan, and mechanical forces, while at the 
origin of living beings only recognize mechanical forces. On the opposite corner, 
there are those who maintain that mechanical, physico-chemical forces cannot 
originate any building plan. An essential factor must exist “that stands above 
the mechanical forces, to which it directs, so that from diverse parts originates a 
whole that works in conformity to a plan” ( Uexk üll 1913, 156; my transl.). This 
supermechanical factor is for Uexküll what we call life. Life is then conformity 
to a plan, that is, a supermechanical law or rule. This leaves life in a diminished, 
regulated and de-autonomized condition, since it associates it with a fixed and 
preestablished plan. 
 Goldstein is notoriously the supporter of an organicist theory of life, accord-
ing to which the fundamental characteristic of the organism and therefore of 
life is the maintenance over time of its organization, understood as a relation 
existing between its parts. Goldstein also states that the organism seeks to actual-
ize its own essence and aspires to self-realization; that is, it aspires not only to 
maintain itself but also to thrive. However, it is Canguilhem who makes greater 
efforts to defend the autonomy and originality of life. In the first place, he does 
so by advocating the autonomy and specificity of biology with respect to the 
physico-chemical sciences. This position leads in general, says Canguilhem, to 
the qualification and accusation of vitalism. It should be made clear, here, that 
Canguilhem understands vitalism as a form of confidence in the organism’s own 
reaction and self-defense, that is to say, in its own curative properties against the 
causal agent of diseases and beyond the constrictor power of remedies. Vitalism 
thus expresses a distrust in the power of technique over life and approaches natur-
ism in its own terms. Vitalism is ultimately “a permanent exigency of life in the 
living, the self-identity of life immanent to the living” ( Canguilhem 2008 , 62). In 
this context, whereas vitalism comes about as an exigency, mechanism imposes 
itself as a method but as a method that creates nothing if not by human skill and 
art. This is why the mechanistic interpretation of the living automatically nullifies 
the living. Life has a spontaneity and a creativity that mechanism, in its eager-
ness to reduce it and decompose it into a simple set of machines, cannot account 
for or explain. For Canguilhem, the constant rebirth of vitalism expresses the 
unwavering resistance and rebellion of life to be subjected to mechanization. This 
resistance and rebellion of life to mechanization is also a resistance to its dissolu-
tion in an impersonal geographical environment and an exigency to place itself 
as a center. It is only from this center that it is possible to generate one’s own sur-
rounding world, an  Umwelt . 
 Conclusion 
 A tension and counterpoint resembling the one between the organism and its envi-
ronment are at play between the theories of Uexküll, Goldstein, and Canguilhem. 
While for Uexküll there is congruity and perfect adjustment between the organ-
ism and its  Umwelt , for Goldstein and Canguilhem, there is debate and coming to 
terms; there is an actualization of the relation that is produced by the institution of 










new norms and values, in other words, biological normativity. Potential estrange-
ment and maladjustment between the organism and its environment are, for Gold-
stein and Canguilhem, the origin of disease. It would be therefore inappropriate 
to consider this debate and coming to terms as an adaptation. In each search of 
normality, the organism does not seek to adapt to an environment that has become 
strange and hostile but seeks to create for itself a new environment according to 
its current conditions by establishing new norms. In this coming to terms, the 
objective is not to survive, that is, to live in a constant situation of “struggle for 
existence.” Such a situation defines instead the pathological state. The ultimate 
goal of the organism is instead to thrive and aspire to self-realization. Also in 
disagreement with the concepts of adaptation and struggle for existence, Uexküll 
sees instead a world in which harmony and perfect correspondence reigns between 
all organisms and their  Umwelten . 
 The question of teleology and sense in organisms is another point in which 
the tension and counterpoint between the theories of Uexküll, Goldstein, and 
Canguilhem become clear. Heir to the Kantian issue of teleology as a regulative 
principle, Goldstein’s organicist approach denies the existence of purposiveness 
in organisms, although he admits it with reservations, provided it is considered in 
almost metaphorical terms. Like Goldstein, Uexküll resorts to von Baer’s theory 
in order to deny the existence of teleology in organisms. However, the case of the 
pea-beetle larva makes him doubt and even admit the possibility of the existence 
of a goal-directedness in the development of organisms. Canguilhem, due to his 
inclination toward the vitalist theory, has a more original position on this subject 
and deems sense essential for the understanding of the living. 
 Regarding the topic of life, the three authors defend the autonomy and speci-
ficity of biology with respect to the physico-chemical sciences, and the irreduc-
ibility of the living being to a set of mere mechanisms. However, they differ quite 
a bit as to their respective notions of life. For Uexküll, life is the expression of 
conformity to a plan, that is, a supermechanical law or rule. This associates life 
with a fixed and preestablished plan. For Goldstein, life is the maintenance of the 
organization of a totality, but also the actualization of an essence whose goal is 
self-realization. Finally, the most affirmative and positive position regarding life 
is that of Canguilhem. For Canguilhem, life is an exigency that resists and rebels 
against mechanization and that seeks to position itself as the generating center of 
its own environment, an  Umwelt . 
 In conclusion, the three authors might converge on the idea that the relationship 
between the organism and its environment is an archaic relation, unfolding in an 
invisible and musical world, in which the melodies of all the organisms interpen-
etrate each other and create a symphony that embraces all. This interpenetration 
accounts for the correspondence between organisms and their  Umwelten in the 
real world, as well as for the existence of meaningful relationships between them. 
This original and common source may well be called a principle, or plan, in refer-
ence to the Uexküllian plan, but it must also possess all the creative characteristics 
of what we call life. 
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